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ABSTRACT 
In my contribution I want to describe a notion of autonomy in social terms namely in 
discursive practices. I already presented autonomy as grounded on the Sellarsian 
“metaphor” of the game of giving and asking for reasons reinterpreted by Robert Brandom. 
The model was centered mostly on practices of justification starting from an inferentialist 
view of the propositional content. However, I think that together with speech acts in 
ordinary language we must provide a description of the role of prelinguistic practices for 
autonomy. This further step is implied by the fact that it is important to clarify the 
dimension of “readiness” to give or ask for reasons on which Swindler rightly insists in his 
Introduction to my book Autonomy. A Matter of Content. Autonomy develops in a language 
game that is connected with cooperation. The language game I want to point out is similar 
to the functional approach of Wittgenstein but starts from a Fregean perspective and takes 
into consideration neurobiological processes which bridge the gap between brain and world 
and represent the “motor” of our activity in the world. 
 
 
0. Introduction 
 
My proposal is to sketch a notion of autonomy in social terms starting from an 
analysis of communication and language. Autonomy requires the 
consideration of an “expressive rationality” that entails two levels: the 
perceptual and emotional level we share with animals and the level of ordinary 
language peculiar to humans. Deficiencies on those level obviously undermine 
full autonomy. 
I refer to some issues on collective intentionality because in the researches of 
this group of very brilliant authors we find serious attempts to go in depth on 
our prelinguistic and linguistic practices. In my view, autonomy is bound to 
language even in the most basic fact of communication. 
The perspectives I find more compatible with my personal view are the ones 
of John Searle, Margareth Gilbert and Jennifer Hudin. Indeed, they do not 
present a theory of autonomy nevertheless they consider important theoretical 
issues such as free will and motor cognition (Searle, Hudin) and conversation 
(Gilbert). Very interesting ideas come from the notion of “normative freedom” 
introduced by James Swindler. 
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I refer to these authors because they try to explain the process of 
cooperation and I think that autonomy develops in a language game that is 
connected with cooperation. To understand what is cooperation is a crucial 
point for the development of my view of autonomy. I want to underscore the 
most important idea of Searle’s work: to bring Frege’s notion of thoughts 
down to earth. Logical properties of objects are biological properties that can 
be grasped by animal and human beings; thoughts going through our mind are 
also neurobiological processes in the brain and these very processes have their 
logical properties. “Thinking is as natural as digesting”. 
 I’ll briefly refer to (1) intentionality which is our relationship to objects; (2) 
communication and language emerging from consciousness; (3) collective 
intentionality; (4) collective intentionality as located in the brain and (5) the 
relationship between conversation as a form of cooperation and autonomy. 
 
 
1. Intentionality 
 
“Intentionality” is a traditional term philosophers use for that capacity of the 
mind to be directed at objects or state of affairs in the world, that are 
independent of itself. Our cognition and action begin with a typical intentional 
activity. The term derives from the medieval Latin word intentio. Unconscious 
and conscious mental states are caused by and realized in brain structures. 
They possess intentionality. According to Searle we can explain the 
functioning of mental processes in neurobiological terms; for this reason I refer 
to some late arguments of Searle that enrich the perspective he described in 
the book Intentionality (Searle 1983). Searle starts from Frege’s account of 
visual perception and uses neurobiological arguments. If for example, I am 
seeing a yellow ovoid lemon at point-blank range in broad daylight what are 
the element of my perceptual situation? First, there is the lemon itself. Second, 
there is unconscious visual experience that I have the lemon. The conscious 
experience has intrinsic intentionality implying that it could be satisfied or not 
satisfied depending on whether there really is a lemon there. Third, the lemon 
must cause the visual experience. This is standardly done by neurobiological 
processes. The processes begin with the reflection of light waves off the lemon, 
which attacks the photoreceptor cells of the retina, and sets up a sequence of 
experience in the brain that goes through until there is a conscious visual 
experience. We must underscore that a person could have a visual experience 
exactly like that which was not satisfied. So in case of visual experience we 
have “self-reflexivity” instead of “self-referentiality” which is used in case of 
conditions of satisfaction of speech acts. Self-reflexivity means that actual 
features of the vehicle of representation function in determining the conditions 
of satisfaction. The vehicle of representation is the conscious visual experience 
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that must be caused by the state of affairs constituting the rest of conditions 
of satisfaction. Otherwise the visual experience is simply not satisfied.  
There is a fundamental distinction to make between experience and 
perception. Experience belongs to that level in which the mind state could be 
or not satisfied. In perception there is the same intentional content but it is in 
fact satisfied. Experience gives us a direct awareness of the object namely 
using a Fregean word provides a “presentation” and not just a 
“representation” of the object. In Intentionality this account was called by 
Searle “naïve realism” (Giovagnoli 2000). Naïve realism entails that conscious 
visual experience does not represent the object in the sense of being an entity 
that intervenes between the subject and the object rather it is the means by 
which the subject perceive the object. Visual experience is by definition a 
constitutive part of the visual perception but the object is not a constituent of 
the visual experience considered independently of whether or not it is in fact 
veridical or satisfied.  
Searle’s account of experience gives rise to the well-known problem of 
“particularism” namely how we can account for the knowledge of a particular 
thing (Bach 2007). He rejects any view on which the contents are “object-
dependent” (Evans, McDowell, Burge). Kent Bach notices that Searle explains 
awareness of the object only “under a description” and a description is no 
substitute for awareness: one is aware of the object as just the cause of the 
experience. The result of Bach’s discussion is that we must give up the 
supposition that the content of perceptual experience determines its condition 
of satisfaction and he proposes an indexical view of experience. In his view an 
experience is “token-reflexive”:«not because it refers to itself but because, 
being perceptual, its content is context-sensitive. The condition of satisfaction 
is experience-relative. To experience a certain event or state of affairs is to 
experience it from a certain point of view. That is, you experience it in a 
spatio-temporal relation to your point of view. But though you experience it 
in an experience-relative way, you do not experience it under an experience-
relative description. It is by having the experience at a certain time and place, 
with a certain orientation that the time and the place of the event or state of 
affairs experienced can be represented as being when and where it is» (Bach 
2007 p. 75).      
I would underscore that Searle distinguish between unconscious visual 
experience which provides awareness of the object and genuine perception that 
is conscious but not indexical. Rather, using a phenomenological point of 
view, it is a reflex of the position of our body in the world.  
According to the intentionalistic account advanced by Searle, one of the 
Background features of the system of perception is that typical objects we 
perceive exist independently of the perception. In perception it is part of the 
intentional content that the object exists independently of the perception; 
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consequently if we discover that the object we were looking at does not exist 
when we were perceiving it then it was not the “real” object and the 
intentional content was not in fact satisfied. Using a geometrical jargon, 
according to the results of background and network capacities, we say that the 
very conditions of satisfaction of the perception of three dimensional, solid 
material objects like the lemon require that they exist independently of the 
experience of the lemon.  
By continuing to use a geometrical or spatial jargon we can now give a brief 
description of the relationship between perception and indexicality. Clearly 
there are linguistic expressions that are indexicals namely indicate relations in 
which the objects stand to the very utterance of the expression itself. For 
instance, “yesterday” refers to the day before utterance or “I” refers to the 
person making the utterance. Searle isolates four types of lexicalized indexical 
relations: spatial, temporal, utterance-directional (I or We and you) and 
discoursal (like latter of former). I would underscore an important and 
agreeable critical observation to Kaplan: it seems to me that the way in which 
indexicals are conceivable rules out the possibility of indexicalizing worlds (for 
example with the world “actual”). On the contrary, it is easy to grasp the self-
referentiality or self-reflexivity of the indexical “I” or of visual experience. “I“ 
in virtue of its meaning refers to the person who uttered it and if I see an 
object in front of me then the visual experience of the object itself figures in 
the conditions of satisfaction. Namely, my visual perception is successful only 
if the features and presence of the object caused that very visual experience. 
According to Searle, the main difference between the two sorts of cases is that 
the perceptual cases are “causally” self-referential and the “indexical” cases 
are not. Why is there a formal similarity between perception and language? It 
is fundamental for the conceptual apparatus we have evolved that we take our 
physical situation, the situation of our bodies in space and time and the causal 
relations between our bodies and the rest of the world as a fundamental 
starting point to conceptualize our relations with the world. Therefore, 
expressions like “I”, “you”, “here” and “now” as well as demonstratives like 
“this” and “that” reflect the centrality of our bodily position in space and time 
and the causation in the conceptual apparatus we have evolved. Intentionality 
shows the development of what the subject “takes to be”. 
 
 
2. Language 
 
We can use language in a “we” form that is not a “we” in Sellars’ or 
Wittgenstein’s sense but a “we” in a more fundamental sense.  My claim is 
that the way in which Searle explains the nature and the function of language 
could give us categories sufficient to explain collective intentionality and 
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autonomy even though with a subtle modification. Let’s introduce some ideas 
relevant for a possible and plausible notion of autonomy. 
The first important thesis is that intentional states possess propositional 
content bound to a certain psychological mode. For instance, we can believe 
that it is raining, fear that it is raining or hope that it is raining. In each of 
these cases we have the same propositional content “that it is raining” but 
different psychological modes. On the level of language this option 
corresponds to the distinction between propositional content of the speech act 
and mode or force of it (command, question etc). Searle’s notation is the 
following: “S (p)” represents the psychological state and (p) represents the 
propositional content.  “F (p)” is the illocutive act where “F” represents the 
propositional content. Statements like beliefs have the downward direction of 
fit; orders and promises like desires and intentions have the upward direction 
of fit. 
To understand why language is constitutive of human social practices we 
must investigate the differences between prelinguistic and linguistic forms of 
intentionality. Prelinguistic intentionality lacks crucial features such as 
meaning convention and sentences with an internal syntactical structure. What 
seems to be common is communication because lots of prelinguistic animals 
have the capacity to communicate with other animals by way of signaling. 
But we need to distinguish between making the signal as a physical act and 
giving the signal as a vehicle of communicating meaning. 
According to Searle, expressions that have a meaning are those the speaker 
intentionally performs; this means that speakers impose conditions of 
satisfaction on condition of satisfaction.  One of the most essential features of 
language is its capacity to be used to perform speech acts to represent states of 
affairs according to different directions of fit and we do this by imposing 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction. For instance some 
expressions that maybe emerged as a first form of human communication such 
as “fire”, “food”, “ranger” had a big relevance for intersubjective practices 
because conventions create expectations for speakers and interlocutors as 
regard a possible common identification of something and the comprehension 
of expressions. In this sense, the normative character of linguistic procedures 
provides the speakers justifiable expectations; it exists a correct way to use 
words. 
The minimum unit of communication in linguistic practices is the speech act 
i.e. the full sentence. Consequently we have the possibility of expressing a full 
intentional state. We must thus understand how different parts of the 
sentences compose, namely how the “principle of compositionality” 
introduced by Frege works. We ought to be able to individuate repeatable 
devices each of them could function as communicative unit (sentence) and 
these must be compound of elements (words) such that the communicative 
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content of the entire is determined by elements and principles of their 
combination in the sentence. As animals have capacities for identifying and re-
identifying objects so we can introduce names of objects and because they 
have the capacity to recognize different tokens of the same type then we can 
introduce general names such “dog”, “cat”, “man” and, because objects have 
features, we could introduce something corresponding to adjectives and verbs. 
At this point, we must underscore the crucial restrictions on these devices; we 
can namely assume that reference and predication of the speech acts that 
correspond to substantive sentences and predicative sentences are independent 
units. Following Frege and the principle of context, we must move from the 
total speech act i.e. from the entire sentence and to abstract from it nominal 
sentences and predicative sentences. Animals do not have reference and 
predication correspondent to nominative and predicative sentences.  
The sentence, as we have seen, is compound of elements that have a sense 
and these elements together with the rules of their combinations allow us to 
generate new sentences and to represent meanings of sentences and expressions 
we have never heard before. Together with compositionality there is 
“generativity”. According to Searle, we obtain generativity by adding to 
compositionality some recursive rules that are valid forever. Examples of these 
rules are expressions like “it is possible that”, “Sally believes that” or rules to 
form relative clauses like “Sally saw the man that…”. Connectives like “and”, 
“or” “if…then” and “not” have the same function. 
A further essential level entails the introduction of commitments namely 
the deontic character of linguistic uses, which is not present in prelinguistic 
forms of intentionality. Commitments are called by Searle “deontologies” and 
recognized deontologies make possible to constitute society. There is a 
deontology that possesses a peculiar logical propriety and is essential for 
comprehending the creation of social and institutional reality: the creation of a 
deontology of commitments as well as rights, duties, obligations etc. creates 
desires independent reasons for actions. When I perform a statement, for 
instance, I have a desire independent reason for saying the truth because my 
expression commits me to tell the truth. The speech act goes beyond the 
simple expression of an intention or belief because it is first a public action. If, 
for instance, I am saying someone something I am not saying that I have a 
belief or intention but I am saying something about the word represented by 
that belief or intention. When I assert something I’m saying how the world is 
and in making a promise I am saying what I am going to do. In this sense I do 
not agree with the claim that one is only to assert what one knows 
(Williamson) or that one must be sincere in making an assertion (Green). I also 
criticized the primacy of “assertion” in Robert Brandom’s sense as it 
presupposes a strong form of conceptual knowledge (Giovagnoli 2008a, 2008b).  
Self-referentiality obtains because, as in the case of promising, when we 
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promise we not only promise to do something but we promise to do it because 
we promised to do it namely we gave our word.   
 
 
3. Collective Intentionality 
 
Humans but also a lot of other animals have collective intentionality. Are 
there differences between the two forms of collective intentionality? Are we 
entitled to investigate our own practices because for instance we are 
responsible for a lot of interventions destroying the environment we share with 
animals? I think yes we must investigate the dimension of commitment 
implied by our linguistic practices. At this point I would refer to collective 
intentionality that realizes in the form of cooperation. My thesis about the 
linguistic game of autonomy is that we need to consider a prelinguistic 
dimension we share with animals and a linguistic dimension we share with 
other people. In order to develop the capacity for autonomy we must 
participate to a peculiar form of cooperation namely conversation, which 
implies both prelinguistic and linguistic competencies. According to Searle, 
cooperation is a matter of human collective intentionality and conversation is 
based on this form of collective intentionality. Searle wants to override the 
notion of conversation as cooperation in Gilbert’s sense because he thinks that 
we do not need a sort of coordination with the attitudes of the others in the 
sense of expectations given by the fact of mutual knowledge. Nevertheless his 
account is not sufficient to explain full autonomy because it presents a kind of 
dichotomy between prelinguistic and linguistic intentionality that seems to 
rule out an important dimension of autonomy namely emotions.  
We intentionality presents the same account of free will as in the case of 
individual intentionality (Searle 2008 forthcoming chap. 3). The first step is to 
distinguish this full-blown free will based on genuine collective intentionality 
from other cases of collective intentionality such as those implied by beliefs 
and desires as to be a member of a religious faith and believe something only 
as part of our faith or because of the fact that I belong to a political movement 
desire something as a part of our desiring it. This is the Searlean conception of 
heteronomy. Let’s now see how he understands the relationship between free 
will and collective intentionality. First, we can not substitute personal 
pronouns namely use “We’ instead of “I” when we consider collective 
intentionality. The most fundamental reason for this is the fact that we can 
share common goals but not common content because if we have to realize a 
common enterprise we must play different roles implying different actions 
with different propositional contents. Otherwise we are doing the same and 
this has no sense for the constitution of a common linguistic game (to use 
Wittgenstein’s vocabulary). We must be able to perform different moves of a 
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game in which we share the goal. However, the presupposition of a shared goal 
is not sufficient to explain full-blown cooperation, which is present in humans 
and other animals. Another insufficient approach is to assume that collective 
intentionality arises among language using adults. If we presuppose language 
in this sense we presuppose society as it is already constituted and we rule out 
collective intentionality in its constitutive role for society. As the analysis of 
speech acts shows, promises derive from more fundamental levels and what is 
very important to me is that the very conversation in which the promise is 
made and is accepted or rejected is already a form of collective intentionality. 
 
 
4. Cooperation and the “Collective Intentionality Operator” 
 
But, before to present some conclusive observations on a possible way to 
develop autonomy in discursive terms, I want to point on a very interesting 
paper of Hudin. I find illuminating to understand the importance of the 
prelinguistic dimension for collective intentionality and cooperation (Hudin 
2009). Hudin plausibly raises doubts about the possibility of explaining 
motivation for believing and acting in a deliberative sense. I find this criticism 
correct and I argued for in my book (Giovagnoli 2007, 2008a). Hudin shows 
the natural reasons we have to cooperate or to act in a we mode and moreover 
the fact that we share this possibility with a lot of animals. It seems an 
important philosophical point to find some natural locus for demonstrating 
the fact that we “can” act in an altruistic way because of an emotional bond. 
Unfortunately I cannot introduce the full discussion, so I refer to some 
examples Hudin presents, which show the work of a collective intentionality 
operator and the fact that subjects entailed in the examples supporting the 
argumentation are not zombies. I quote three examples: 
Two people are engaged in a conversation while they are walking down the 
street. They come to a stoplight at the corner of the street and without 
interrupting their conversation, they stop. When the light turns green, they 
proceed across the street with no lapse in their conversation. 
 
George Bailey decides to commit suicide one snowy evening by jumping off 
a bride into a river when he sees a man who fallen into the river. George jumps 
into the river and saves the drowning man. 
 
Lassie (a dog) sees Timmy fall into the lake. Lassie jumps into the lake and 
pulls Timmy to shore, saving his life. 
 
At first glance these actions seem irrational if we reason according to the 
laws of self-interest. Thus the conditions for social acts we must underscore to 
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overcome the constrains of this approach are the following: 1) They require 
another person to be the act that they are and 2) They require a certain degree 
of self sacrifice even if this means minimally censoring our behavior as regard 
our self interest in order to consider the benefit of another. 
The interesting point of Hudin’s argumentation is the functioning of social 
intentionality as entailed by the Cognitive Operator Principle (COP). In 
Hudin’s words:”First of all, intentional states divide upon into two types of 
directions: as mental states which either match the world as in the case of a 
belief, or the world as it might be, as in the case of imaging the future 
fulfillment of a desire. Searle characterizes these two types of directedness of 
mental states in terms of direction of fit. Beliefs have the mind-to-world 
direction of fit and desires have the world to mind direction of fit. Secondly 
these directions of fit only make sense in so far that they are a feature of 
mental states that belong to someone. Further more the sole possessor of any 
mental state is always in the first person singular, the self” (Hudin 2009). 
Hudin’s challenge to Searle is to demonstrate that COP is responsible for 
collective intentionality by showing how neural mechanism could operate to 
transform the indexicality of mental state from I to We, from the Self into a 
Collective Self. It is clear to me that Hudin criticizes the phenomenological 
notion of empathy in Husserl’s sense and she does not believe that neuron’s 
mirror could do the job of COP. I also agree that there must be some other 
explanation of collective intentionality because Husserl met a lot of problems 
when he presented his notion of intersubjectivity (Giovagnoli 2000) and 
furthermore the contemporary works on neuron mirrors are limited, I suppose, 
to some basic functions (but I am not a neuroscientist to draw conclusions on 
this point and I would refer to Rizzolatti, Sinigaglia, Anderson 2007). I find 
very interesting Hudin’s analysis of “social bonding” that is a common 
denominator for animals and humans.  
 
 
5. Conversation, Autonomy and Scoreboard 
 
Let’s now present some possible arguments about the possibility to develop 
autonomy in conversation as a form of cooperation using the idea that we are 
active in this process because we constitute the discursive situation by using 
speech acts.  
My proposal is to extend the model of Searle in two senses: (1) by finding a 
treatment of the force as common to animal and humans and (2) by 
introducing a conception of autonomy related to the “emergency” of what we 
take to be the true and right contents moving from the attitudes of the 
speakers in conversation. Autonomy is the capacity we have to engage in 
conversation that is the locus where we master use speech acts in the two 
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fundamental dimensions of communication and language. As I told in the first 
section, Searle account lacks an explanation of the role of the emotional 
content we express when we engage in conversation. For example he describes 
the functioning of signals in animal and human cases but only from a 
“rational” point of view i.e. from the point of view of the animal rationality 
according to which an animal knows how to behave in case of danger and from 
the point of view of human rationality according to which we know how to 
behave in case of danger and we can also explain the reasons for our behavior 
by using language.  
Autonomy implies the expression of the individual point of view in 
linguistic situation hence conversation that is a form of “human natural 
cooperation”. I mean that there is an “expressive rationality” that emerges in 
the game of giving and asking for reason, a game we play with others, to 
which personal autonomy is essentially related. Personal autonomy develops 
in a social context that favors “pluralism” because pluralism increases the 
possibility of choice namely freedom (Giorello 2005).  The game possesses an 
important emotional side that can clearly be described starting from personal 
experience and perception. On the linguistic level the emotional side is 
expressed in some fundamental speech acts: assertion, question and negation.  
I think that this theoretical option could be further elaborated starting from 
some Fregean ideas. In some late works Frege considers the role of linguistic 
uses to grasp the very content of the assertion and plausibly considers truth as 
a “goal” of communication. We must concentrate on a fundamental 
distinction — indeed not very easy to individuate — Frege presents between 
assertion (intended as simple affirmation or expression of a thought including 
a content that can be judged) and judgment, because judgment could be 
intended as an “advancing” from thought to its truth-value. In my opinion, 
this distinction supports contemporary attempts to distinguish between truth 
and justification (Marconi 2007). The metaphor of the game of giving and 
asking for reasons shows conditions relevant for autonomy. I would underscore 
the relevance of the agent’s full linguistic competence for performing not only 
“correct”, but even simple moves namely to express her “thoughts” so that 
the contents of beliefs can be recognized as true in discursive situations 
through correct grammatical-substitutional rules.  
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